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Received 27 February 20031. In which conditions can a person be constituted and recognize herself as herself ?
What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person? Several answers
have been explored by philosophers—having an individual body, and individual brain, having
speciﬁc introspective access to ones thoughts. They all turned out to be non-starters. A major
reason why they do not work, is that they fail to account in a non-circular way for the fact that a
person is inherently both a stable and a changing entity; an entity, furthermore, who knows
herself as herself. If the essence of a person is to be an historical object, a ‘‘continuant,’’ it follows
that the only ability through which a person can be revealed to herself is memory. Locke gives us
the following indication:E-m
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doi:10As far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at ﬁrst, and
with the same consciousness it has of any present action, so far it is the same personal self (Essay, II, XXVII, 10).Now this identity between a consciousness that ‘‘repeats’’ a past action and the consciousness
that accomplished it involves an interesting semantic property. To reach knowledge of oneself as
oneself, more than a simple factual identiﬁcation to an ‘‘I then’’ with an ‘‘I now’’ is required.What
is further needed is that the ‘‘I’’ is recognized as the same by himself across these two cases. Let us
take for example a memory in which I recall that I visited the Versailles castle. It is not suﬃcient
that the I in ‘‘I recall’’ and the I in ‘‘I visited the Versailles castle’’ happen to refer to the same
person. I must in addition know that both tokens of ‘‘I’’ refer to one and the same person, me.
Contrast this with the use of the third-person pronoun in the following sentence: ‘‘John thinks
about his father; he remembers the day when he died.’’ The ﬁrst ‘‘he’’ refers to John, the second
refers to his father. There is no co-reference in the sentence.
One might think that in the case of ‘‘I,’’ two tokens must necessarily co-refer when they are
thought by the same thinker. That it is not necessarily the case, can be seen if you take, forail address: jproust@ehess.fr (J. Proust).
100/$ - see front matter  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
.1016/S1053-8100(03)00077-1
496 J. Proust / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 495–509example, two messages of your computer: ‘‘I need help,’’ ‘‘I found three answers to your query.’’
These two instances of ‘‘I’’ clearly do not need to include conscious co-reference: the message is
conveyed to you even though your computer has no speciﬁc self-representation constituting the
unitary framework for the two usages. What applies to the computer may also apply to usages of
the ﬁrst-person pronoun in language-instructed apes, in young children or in patients with neu-
rological disorders. Hector-Neri Castaneda called1 ‘‘quasi-indexical usage,’’ noted ‘‘I*,’’ the ap-
plication of the ﬁrst-person pronoun when there is a recognition of the co-reference between the
two tokens of ‘‘I’’ in such contexts as reported above (‘‘oblique contexts’’). In I* cases, the subject
who forms the belief and the subject to whom a property is attributed (in the belief) are recognized
as identical. Without such a capacity to refer through a designator that relates reﬂexively two
contexts with an I-tag, as in ‘‘I believe that I did it, that I saw it,’’ etc., one might acquire types of
information that in fact (or implicitly) are about myself, but fail to know explicitly that it is about
myself that they are.
It is thus clear that instantaneous types of self-awareness as can be oﬀered in perceiving or
acting cannot suﬃce to give us access to a self as identical to him/herself over time. As an in-
variant, a self cannot be reached in a single snapshot. This epistemological claim is related to a
corresponding metaphysical claim: a person cannot exist aside from a historical process, such that
a sequence of cognitive states allow this or that personal identity to emerge. To be a person, one
needs minimally to be conscious of two diﬀerent things and to bring these two contents together in
the same present conscious experience.2 This kind of co-consciousness involves more than lining
up various attributions to myself (for example, ‘‘I remember that I visited Versailles Castle; I am
now looking at the picture I then took’’). It requires a capacity to recognize the identity between
the ‘‘I’’ as a conscious subject and the ‘‘I’’ as the topic of a report, a memory, etc.
If one now decides to oﬀer an account of persons in terms of individual memory, two things
have to be done. One consists in examining whether selves are bona ﬁde entities, and, if they are, in
showing what they consist in. The other is to explain how one gets access to the self one is, or is
supposed to be—without involving any circular reference to a previously introduced self. It is
worth brieﬂy recalling Lockes own claim that conscious memory of prior perception and action
constitutes personal identity, and show why it fails to provide the kind of non-circular account we
are after. In Lockes ‘‘simple memory theory’’ (as we will call it) being a person simply depends on
the continuity of memories that an individual can bring to her consciousness. Even if we do not
recall all the facts of our past lives, memories do overlap, which delineates the extension of a
continuing person.2. Problems of the simple memory theory
Lockes deﬁnition of a person raises various problems—some of which have been solved.
We will have to summarize them brieﬂy in order to capitalize on the results of these classical1 Castaneda (1994).
2 This observation does not imply that properties made available in perceptual experience (whether proprioceptive,
visual or auditory) and in the experience of acting cannot be included in the consciousness one has of being identical to
oneself. More on this later.
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his life. The old general remembers having been a brave oﬃcer, and as a brave oﬃcer he could
remember having been whipped for stealing apples when a child. But the old general does not
remember the childs being whipped. Reid concludes that, according to Locke, the old general
both is and is not the same person as the whipped child.
A simple memory theory is also relying on a quite obvious kind of circularity.4 In requesting
that the appropriate way in which Ss memory was caused should be one in which S himself
observed or brought about an event, one insists implicitly that the person who remembers is the
very same person that witnessed the event or acted in it. How might a self ever be constituted, if
one already needs to reidentify oneself through memory to get self-cognition under way?
Sydney Shoemaker oﬀered an interesting, if controversial, solution to cope with these two
diﬃculties. He deﬁnes the psychological state of ‘‘having an apparent memory from the inside’’ as
what one has when the concrete memory of an event jumps to mind, in contrast to memories that
do not involve any direct participation. For example, you may remember ‘‘from the inside’’
witnessing the coronation of Queen Elisabeth the second, as it was an experience you may have
had. Whereas you cannot remember from the inside the coronation of Carlus Magnus. Thus
characterized (that is, by deﬁnition) being in this state does not presuppose necessarily that one is
the person who actually had the experience. The general strategy is to deﬁne true memory on the
basis of apparent memory (the subjective impression of having had an experience), and to build
the notion of a person through a succession of overlapping apparent memories. In this view,
personal identity cannot consist in remembering all the events of ones life, but in an ordered
relation between direct rememberings, such that each one is connected to the few previous ones. In
Parﬁts version of this improved deﬁnition, there is a person when there are ‘‘overlapping chains of
direct memory connections.’’5
Another problem however is raised by the simple theory, as well as by the versions just sket-
ched. It is connected to one of the consequences of the quasi-indexical nature, reﬂexive meaning of
the ‘‘I*,’’ namely the unicity of the I*-thinker. In order to constitute personal identity through
overlapping memories, we need to secure the quasi-indexical property of the two tokens of ‘‘I’’:
the one who remembers and the one who initially acted or perceived. But even though continuity
of memory is realized, there is no conceptual guarantee that there is only one man who fulﬁlls the
memory condition imposed for being the same person. Leibniz seems to have been the ﬁrst to
underline this diﬃculty.6 He reasons in the following way. Let us suppose that there is a twin
earth, crowded with people exactly similar to the inhabitants of this earth. Each of a pair of twins
will have all the physical and mental properties of the other, including the same memories. Are they
two persons or one? Clearly, Leibniz observes, an omniscient being such as God would see the
spatial relation between the two planets, and discriminate them. But if we stick to a mental
property narrowly conceived such as memory, that is, the consciousness of having seen or acted,
there will be no way of justifying the intuition that a person is unique.3 Reid (1785) in Perry (1975, p. 114).
4 On this question, see Parﬁt (1984), Shoemaker (1970, 1996), Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984), and Proust (1996).
5 Parﬁt (1984, p. 205).
6 Leibniz, (1705/1997), II, 27, 23.
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identity that rely on a ‘‘Cartesian’’ psychological property, that is, a property of the individuals
mental states individuated in a purely functional way (independently of the context of her
thoughts and memories that—in externalist views of meaning—contribute to the very content of
what she thinks). Inserting copies of the same set of memories in previously ‘‘washed’’ brains
would result in the same kind of reduplication as the twin earth story.7 The problem is not, of
course, that such a circumstance is around the corner, but that there is no conceptual answer to
the Leibnizian question: how many persons are there? One? Two? More? And if the copying is
imperfect, can one say that two of the clones in the same set are ‘‘approximately’’ the same
person?
The simple memory theory has more recently revived in narrative views of the self, defended
either in the context of an artefactual theory of the self (Dennett, 1991), or as a substantial,
hermeneutic theory of human persons (Gallagher, 2000; Ricoeur, 1990). Each of us is supposed to
reconstruct, or have access to the self he/she is by unpacking retrospectively his/her particular
memory sequence. This version belongs however to the class of simple memory theories and
therefore, falls prey to the reduplication argument. Moreover, the kind of narrative that is selected
suggests at best an idealized view of oneself, reduced to the requirements of story telling (avoid
redundancy, only select salient facts, produce retrospective continuity, rely on the beneﬁts of
hindsight). Thus, the descriptive condition on memory overlap combines freely, on this view, with
a normative dimension of which memories are worth contributing to ones self-narrative; this
normative dimension may create a diﬃculty if one defends a realist view on the self. For it is
diﬃcult to dissociate it from the genre of story telling; the self appears clearly as a ﬁctional entity
reconstructible in variable ways according to present values. These two observations suggest that
the narrative view on the self is more consonant with a reductionist metaphysics—one in which
there is no self to know, and in which the self just is the story that an individual human being is
telling on her prior life at a given time.
One interesting feature of the narrative view, however, is that it highlights a possible function of
self-focused memory. Rather than being a detached contemplation, memory appears as an active,
retrospective evaluation of former actions and perceived events, with an eye on future actions and
dispositions to act.8 This feature may not disqualify memory from contributing to individuating
selves; but the type of memory required by a realist approach is supposed to shape a working self,
not a decorative entity. (Another way to convey this point is to say that a realist on the self is
interested in the ontology of self, not in self-ideology.) To prevent arbitrary focusing on speciﬁc7 This observation led Velleman (1996) to distinguish selfhood, deﬁned perspectivally (as remembering and
anticipating experiences ﬁrst personally) with the identity of a person. See in particular p. 66 and p. 75, footnote 53.
8 This dimension did not escape Lockes attention: ‘‘Wherever a man ﬁnds what he calls himself, there, I think,
another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only to
intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness and misery.’’ Locke, 1695/1971, II, XXVII, 26, t. I, p. 291. This
observation suggests that the self is not only a matter of private enjoyment. From a sociological viewpoint, one would
claim that its function is to distinguish and stabilize statuses and roles in a social body, as well as to apply the
gratiﬁcations and the sanctions inherent to social control. For lack of space, we will not examine further this aspect of
selves in the present article.
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memory must express directly the normative–directive function of memory in connection to in-
tentions and plans; it must be an internal, not an accidental feature of the memory process. Fi-
nally, the type of memory involved must also be such as to avoid reduplication: it must be not
only a mental process that activates psychological states in a subject (I remember doing or seeing
this and that), but it should secure the numerical identity of the person. What kind of mental
process might ﬁll these requirements?
We just saw that in order to obtain the strong reﬂexivity of I* that is needed for self-reiden-
tiﬁcation, memory must participate actively in transforming the organism through the very
process of remembering. The form of memory that considers the past in the light of an individuals
present worries, and that aims at actively transforming the individuals mind in part through that
memory, is the memory involved in mental action—a form of metacognition. The claim defended
here will accordingly be that mental action alone can deliver the required temporal and dynamical
properties that tie the relevant remembered episodes together. Constituting a person presupposes
the capacity to act mentally, that is, to consciously monitor and control ones own mental states
on the basis of ones past experiences and of ones projects. For such a conscious monitoring of
mental actions to occur, a speciﬁc capacity must develop over a lifetime. Monitoring ones mental
actions consists in rationally revising—and adequately refocusing—ones prior dispositions to act,
to plan, to remember, to reason, to care, and to reach emotional stability. Memory plays a central
role in this form of normative metacognition; although philosophers who have studied memory
may not have realized this, ‘‘memory’’ is involved in most types of control. Thus, using a
philosophical jargon, to be a self presupposes a capacity of self-aﬀection. Self-memory is the
dynamical ability of modifying ones states deliberately to reach new states that are seen as more
desirable. Our claim will be that an individual’s way of gaining both a self and an access to it should
be constituted not by the process of recalling alone, but by being conscious of being aﬀected, or
transformed, through that very process. This new hypothesis will be called ‘‘the revised memory
theory.’’3. The revised memory theory of personal identity
What is a mental action? To understand what it consists in, it is useful to compare it with a
physical action. Let us consider an example. When you are training yourself in a sport, you put
your body in a condition to fulﬁll new functions that you ﬁnd desirable; in tennis, for example,
you aim at learning how to execute certain kinds of gestures, like a half-volley or a topspin
forehand; you follow all the steps instrumental to reach these goals, i.e., by observing others
performing the gestures correctly, by modifying your own bodily attitudes and by discriminating
various relevant new properties in the objects involved (the ball, the racket, etc.).
Mental action is very similar to physical action; but instead of modifying physical objects in
space, what it aims at modifying are mental states in the agent. In spite of all the eﬀorts aimed at
bending spoons, it is clear that there is only one thing that can be transformed through mental
action, that is the very mind of the agent who acts mentally. Nor is mental action something
diﬃcult or exceptional, requiring a speciﬁc training or mediumnic capacities. It only requires using
ones past experience to monitor actively ones informational or emotional content: modify ones
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emotions (to become harder-hearted or to mellow). Mental actions may also be required to
monitor ones attention, ones motivations (I ﬁrst ﬁnish the book before I give my phone call),
ones addictions (I will smoke only one cigarette before lunch). Therefore, mental actions play a
fundamental role in shaping ones life. They make possible the capacity to govern oneself, to
reorient the course of ones thoughts, ones desires, ones learning; they allow for the adjustment of
motivation and eﬀort, for persistence or change in love, seduction and disgust, for the choice of a
ﬁeld of activity and for the scope of ones responsibility. All these actions can be redescribed as
self-monitoring for the beneﬁt of self-control; from an initial mental state, and a particular set of
dispositions, they are needed to actively acquire new mental states (new contents or new attitudes
to old contents) and dispositions.
3.1. Constituting a self
In short, self-aﬀection refers to the general ability of taking new mental states and properties as
goals of action, and of pursuing these goals. Given such an ability, the sense of being oneself, a
person identical over time, with the strong reﬂexivity on which the notion of a person depends,
consists in the ability to consciously aﬀect oneself: in the memory of having aﬀected oneself, joint to
the consciousness of being able to aﬀect oneself again.
In the context of a discussion of Frankfurts view on the self, Velleman (2002, 111) observes
that the reﬂexivity of the control exerted over ones own behavior does not oﬀer access to a single
entity. The present paper argues however that there is a level of control that needs to put all the
various reﬂexive mental states (perceptions, intentions, and thinking episodes) in harmony for a
consistent interaction with other agents and with nature to be at all possible. The emergence of the
self in phylogeny might reﬂect the extension of human memory, compared to other primates;
verbal communication allows commitments to be taken, social roles to be attributed, as well as
sophisticated plans—social or technological. The mind of an individual participating in this kind
of communication and action needs to adjust ﬂexibly to new tasks and environments (it must
change itself without losing track of its own previous states). The self is the dynamic function that
results from this set of selective pressures. While self-conceptions may considerably vary from one
society to another, the structure that is here described under the term of ‘‘self’’ is a universal
feature of our species.
It is an a priori necessity that a mental agent permanently monitors and changes her own
knowledge state, her own emotions, or her own present conduct. In other words, a mental agent
‘‘cares about’’ her mental life (to borrow another Frankfurts expression), and knows—at least in
a practical way—how mental properties (the amount and quality of knowledge reached, of at-
tention focused, of motivation gathered) aﬀect her dealings with the external world. In the present
perspective, the type of mental structure on which a self supervenes is gained in the exercise of the9 Harry Frankfurt (1988) develops the view that second-order volitions are fundamental for a person to come to
existence. His view diﬀers from the present one in so far as self-reidentiﬁcation is based on a process of ‘‘identifying with
ﬁrst-order volitions,’’ while here more general revisional processes are taken to provide the functional condition for self-
reidentiﬁcation. Furthermore, the present view rejects the claim that a person has an individual essence based on the
motives she identiﬁed with. See Velleman (2002) for an interesting discussion on this point.
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process provide the kind of continuous link needed for reidentiﬁcation, just as in simple memory
theories. Contrary to these, however, only mental agents may qualify for selfhood; agents able to
form memories of their previous actions and observations, but not to act mentally—those re-
stricted to physical actions—do not develop into persons.10 Individuals of this kind would be
unable to resist their impulsions, as is the case for Harry Frankfurts wantons, for lack of any
control on what they think and do.11 The reason why these individuals do not qualify for selfhood
is not that they cannot access their own bodily condition and care for it, not that they cannot
remember how their body, or prior physical condition was (these types of knowledge are indeed
present in non-human primates, a good illustration of wantons). It is that they fail to monitor
their long-term dispositions, revise their beliefs or plans. If they neither understand, nor care, for
the consequences that courses of action have on their control capacity, they cannot reorganize
their preferences in the light of overall constraints. ‘‘Self’’ thus designates an endogenous indi-
vidual structure of the will based on a form of metacognitive memory.
Note moreover that reﬂexivity and, consequently, numerical identity are intrinsic to the per-
manent revisional process in which acting mentally consists. This is crucial to prevent the redu-
plication problem. Even if, at a given moment, an individuals thought was copied into anothers
mind, each clone would re-individuate herself through the practical reﬂexivity that governs her
mental actions; as soon as each agent has revised her beliefs to act in her own sphere, with her own
body, she has become a person with the double backward/forward dimensions of reidentiﬁcation
that are open to her.
What about the normative dimension of selves? Clearly, the capacity to remember how one
acted, joint to the capacity to change ones plans, open up opportunities for commitment. The self
is constituted by the normative commitment that an agent (not a self, yet, let us call the relevant
instance of agency: a mind) having information on her states has to revise her dispositions—if
incoherence or means-end inadequacy arises, or in the case in which there is a conﬂict in her habits
and her preferences, and to oﬀer (to herself or to others) a justiﬁcation of what she did in terms of
the content of her attitudes in relation to a goal. ‘‘Justiﬁcation’’ should be understood here in a
minimal way: the agent just aims at behaving rationally, in the sense that she does not want to lose
her physical and mental resources on goals that are detrimental, meaningless to her, or impossible
to reach. In others words, an agent tends to act on the basis of her preferences. An important
thing to observe at this point, is that most (physical and ordinary) actions presuppose a capacity
for mental action; they require planning and deliberation, emotional control, directed learning,
and other forms of memory control; they are eﬀected through a mental simulation that may itself
be rehearsed and modiﬁed.
We are now in a position to respond to Velleman: how do we get unicity in the mental or-
ganization if not from the coincidence between the mind that revises and the mind that is being
revised? Selves are results of metacognitive processes in which minds reorganize themselves to be
more attuned to their physical and social worlds. The revised memory theory of selfhood therefore
suggests that to be a self, an agent must:10 See Proust (2000) for a thought experiment to this eﬀect.
11 See Frankfurt (1988).
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appreciating, adjusting, and revising prior preferences about mental goals.
(b) Form overlapping memories of previous revision episodes.
(c) Reorient ones own mental actions on the basis of (a) and (b); revisions are used in the course
of planning overlapping future courses of mental actions.3.2. Accessing the self
Now let us turn to the second question we had to answer: how can a mental agent get access
to the self that emerges from her dispositions to act mentally? In order to give a clear answer
to the question, we need to develop the distinction between control and monitoring—two di-
mensions that have to be present in an organism capable of autonomous action. Any control
process, however complex, is composed of a two-phased cycle; in the eﬀerent phase, a com-
mand based on an internal simulation of what is to be achieved (providing a form of expec-
tation of what the environment is like) is sent to the active organs (muscles, or—in case of a
mental action—internal thought processes); the second phase gathers information and possibly
replaces the anticipated with the observed feedback for the sake of further control purposes.12
If such is the functional division of any control structure, the self exists in virtue of the whole
structure, and the question whether it belongs rather to the control level, where the norms are
constructed and used in prediction, or to the observed feedback level, where the actual evidence
is sampled for further revision of former plans, does not need to be reﬂected in two inde-
pendent objective dimensions inside the self. Just as in the case of normal action, you do not
need to distinguish how the action was programmed from how it eventually went (the two
courses are more or less coextensive; what matters is that correction can be executed in case
unexpected things happen).
Now the question of how an individual gets access to herself presents us with the possibility of
two choices—a possibility that is interesting for psychological, sociological and for moral reasons.
As we saw above, diﬀerent cultures have various ways of conceiving what a self is. Given the two-
phase (control +monitoring) cycle of any autonomous system of this kind, two emerging struc-
tures might oﬀer access to selfhood. There is the level of what is ideally aimed at (the control
structure); and there is the level of what is observed (the monitoring evidence). These two levels
might play a distinctive role as far as access is concerned; they seem to match respectively the
notions of an ideal vs. an actual self: what the individual sees herself as striving for becoming, vs.
what the individual sees herself as in fact being.
Obviously people may misrepresent who they are. Self-conception is not constrained by per-
ceptual or introspective mechanisms. Although metacognition oﬀers both implicit and explicit
forms of access to previous revision episodes, in particular the most salient and long-term ones,
an individual may be delusional, or simply confused, about who she is. Nothing prevents an12 In the particular case of chosing courses of actions, the cycle control-monitoring is temporally extended over
sequences of varying duration (think of when you decided to be, say, a philosopher, and when you started to get
internal feedback on being able to reach this goal).
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not incorporate into her control system.13
One might at this point speculate that each particular culture frames selves in speciﬁc external
signs that somewhat co-vary with the metacognitive ability that our analysis has pointed out as
being the basis of selves.14 We might further speculate that each human individual can come to
understand from her own practice of mental action how her mind develops into a self, or un-
fortunately also, can dissolve away from a self, when the conditions are present. As we will in-
dicate below, this capacity is certainly fueled by using words—in a public language, like ‘‘I,’’
‘‘you,’’ etc., or proper names—that express the normative and descriptive aspects linked to self-
hood. Use of these words is naturally part of an overall social structure that may, or not, en-
courage individual beings to take responsibility for their own choices and stimulate their own
autonomy in revisional practices.
Now some readers may at this point worry that the present suggestion does not escape a form
of circularity. Here is how the objection might go. One of the most common ways of acting
mentally consists in revising ones beliefs, desires, and ones commitments, as a consequence of
changing circumstances and incoming factual knowledge. It is in this activity that a person is
supposed to be built: to know who one is, it to know, in a practical and concrete way, the global
target and the stake of the revisions and adjustments that have been or are being currently per-
formed in the domain of mental action. Now one might express here the worry that such a mental
kind of activity does not constitute selfhood or personal identity, but rather relies on it. For is not
the individual mental agent already implicitly taken to be/have a self? Is not this latter condition
presupposed for re-identiﬁcation to occur through the revision process? When an agent takes a
revisional commitment, and engages her future on the basis of an evaluation of what she can and
should do, given her present global judgment, is not her own self causing the utterance? So how
could it make sense to extract, so to speak, selfhood from mental agency?
To address this objection, one has to contrast the objectors notion that an action is caused by a
person, with the naturalistic analysis of action. On the latter view, the agent is not supposed to
have a causal role in her actions: her intentional states, or the external properties of the envi-
ronment do. It is natural to say that an agent is responsible for her actions; but at present our
theoretical interest is of another, more ﬁne-grained sort: we have to provide the deﬁnition of a self.
And the only way of doing so is to rely on a subset of her intentional states that do have a causal
role in her actions and that warrant the reﬂexivity of I*. Why cannot we identify the self with all
the agents intentional states? First, because they are an unstable, moving, heterogeneous crow-
d—all but distinctive of this person: look how widely shared are the likes, the dislikes, the
emotions, the beliefs, etc. of each one of us! But also because intentional states can in principle, as
we saw, be copied, and made a priori to characterize several distinct individuals, which leaves us13 Many individuals might thus capitalize on their expected, or simply imagined, mental agency rather than on their
actual evidence for being mental agents capable of revision. The story-telling evoked earlier might induce them in
believing, for example, that they are better planners of their own lives than they actually are. Others might collect
comparative or social evidence (diplomas, external recognition, and friendly reports) for ascertaining which kind of self
they have. All these individuals would thus lack knowledge of who they are, because the proper form of access is located
in the reﬂective sphere that controls preferences and plan revision rather than in public achievements.
14 See Goﬀman (1959).
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before the reﬂexive intervention of revision gets into play. The self results from this reﬂexive
process, and will stop developing, or decay, if the reﬂexive process is interrupted, or is reduced.
To be a person, in this analysis, can thus be reduced to the exercise of a disposition to act
mentally. Such a reduction does not aim at ‘‘doing away’’ with persons, however. Persons may not
be ﬁctions—not only a matter of ‘‘self-presentation.’’ For when somebody pretends to be someone
he is not, he is still expressing his actual capacity at revising and planning. Nor are they sub-
stances, something that remains to be known, observed, made explicit. A person is a system of
dispositions, socially encouraged and trained, designed to revise beliefs, desires, intentions, and
thereby become the actor/goal/target/ of ones own life.4. Pathologies of the self
Recent work on personal identity has attracted philosophers attention to the schizophrenic
delusions; deluded patients indeed seem to change their minds not only on their own personalities,
occupations, and capacities, but also on the very extension of their selves. Some are intimately
convinced that they are deprived of a self and do not know how this word might refer at all; the
word seems to them to provide an artiﬁcial unity to a bunch of multiple and disconnected mental
experiences. Other patients, in contrast, feel included in a wider personal entity that encompasses
not only their own minds, but also others as well.15 The sense of a lost or of a transformed self is
associated with an impression of ‘‘extraneity’’ in thought and/or in action: these patients have the
feeling that their actions are controlled by others, or that their thoughts are inserted in their minds
from without. Such cases seem to suggest that, contrary to traditional claims, one can be wrong
about who one is.16 There is no ‘‘immunity to error through misidentiﬁcation.’’17
We now have to turn to the empirical evidence from neuroscience that might contribute to
explain these symptoms: is the present approach compatible with it? How does our eﬀort at15 A deluded patient for example claims ‘‘I am you (pointing to John) and you (pointing to Peter)’’; an other patient
describes his inner experience in the following terms ‘‘Thoughts have been put in my head that do not belong to me.
They tell me to dress. They check the bath water by doing this gesture.’’
16 See in particular Campbell (1999, 2002), Gallagher (2000), Proust (2000b), and Stephens and Graham (2000).
17 Such immunity was traditionally thought to apply to the usages of self-referring terms such as ‘‘I’’; it consists in
the impossibility of being mistaken about the person who employs the word ‘‘I.’’ What is meant by that, is that there is
an essential asymmetry between the usage of ‘‘I’’ and of other singular personal pronouns, such as ‘‘you’’ or ‘‘he/she/it.’’
I can for example use the word ‘‘he’’ mistakenly, either because the person designated is in fact a woman, or because
what I point to is actually the shadow of a tree. I can also say mistakenly ‘‘you’’ to something with no self. When
someone says ‘‘I,’’ however, the reference seems to be immediately secured and accessible, i.e., without needing any
mediating property to know who ‘‘I’’ could possibly be; besides, it does not seem open to a thinker to be wrong about
whom he means to designate in this way; for this reason, philosophers have concluded that self-attribution in thought
has a special epistemological status: you may certainly be wrong on many of your own characteristics, personality traits,
etc., but never on whom you pick up with the pronoun ‘‘I.’’ This again suggests that in order to refer to yourself, you
dont need to identify a person among others, i.e., yourself rather that this or that other possible ‘‘ego.’’ For if you had
to use some identifying feature to know who you are in the other kinds of personal attribution, you could in
principle—sometimes at least—be wrong about whom you pick up. As it seems that you can never be wrong about that,
it follows that you have to refer to yourself in a way unmediated by identiﬁcation.
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nisms involved in perturbations of the self? An inﬂuential view in the neurophysiology of
schizophrenia is that the capacity to self-attribute a thought, an intention or an action, is de-
pendent upon the control of agency.18 There are at least three diﬀerent ways of articulating this
idea.
(a) Chris Friths most recent view is that a breakdown in the mechanism of eﬀerent copy and
comparator results in the breakdown in the sense of agency. Schizophrenic patients seem to
be unable to monitor their own motor instructions (see for example Frith, Blakemore, & Wol-
pert, 2000). Many studies19 have shown that they rely on visual feedback rather than on the
eﬀerence copy of the motor commands to predict the success of their physical actions; in my
terms: they apply a form of control named ‘‘error-control,’’ instead of applying a ‘‘cause-con-
trol.’’20
(b) An earlier view, also defended by Frith,21 was that the capacity to act in agreement with ones
intentions—in particular, when the intentions are ‘‘endogenously generated,’’ rather than
stimulus-driven (triggered by a routine feature of the context), requires a capacity to attribute
these intentions to oneself. On this view, to be able to act properly, you need to use a theory of
mind, and metarepresent your own states, to understand that you are the agent of your ac-
tions and the thinker of your thoughts.
(c) Marc Jeannerods view is that a common covert simulatory process is activated both when you
see someone act or when you act yourself, generating shared representations of actions.22 The
process through which you attribute an action to the self or to another agent is explained not
at the level of the action-monitoring system, as Frith does, but at the level of the simulation
mechanisms involved in acting and in observing actions: an inability to simulate correctly the
covert operations involved in attributing actions either to self or to another agent, explains
why the patient has an impression of external control.
What is worth observing, ﬁrst, is that these three views on self-attribution are explicitly or not
‘‘control theories’’ of the self. In the ﬁrst view, self-attribution of action is mainly secured by the
forward ‘‘motor’’ model through which the motor and distal consequences of the action are
predicted. In the second, control is operated through a propositional metarepresentation of the
ﬁrst order intention to act. In the third, control is operated oﬀ-line, in covert simulations, and
what is perturbed lies in monitoring the covert reaﬀerences of this postulated additional control
system.
It is to be noted, second, that the three views above do not try to understand how a self-
representation is generated, but with how an action is self-attributed. This latter task may involve,18 In schizophrenic patients, the sense of willful activity seems to be perturbed simultaneously at three main levels:
(i) in the pursuit of reward that structures behavior and goal hierarchy (basal ganglia), (ii) in the imagination and in
the selection of novel actions (dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, left side), and ﬁnally (iii) in the attribution to self of the
eﬀects of an action (right inferior parietal lobule and superior colliculus). These three dimensions are closely involved
in the revision process that have been described above.
19 See for example Frith and Done (1989) and Mlakar, Jensterle, and Frith (1994).
20 On this distinction, cf. Conant and Ashby (1970).
21 See for example Frith (1992).
22 See Daprati et al. (1997), Jeannerod (1999), Proust (2000a), Jeannerod and Pacherie, (submitted).
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establishing whether (and how) a permanent self can be accessed from one self-attribution to
another. The same thing applies to most discussions of the relevance of pathology to solve the
puzzle of immunity to error to misidentiﬁcation of I-thoughts. The whole debate had the merit to
stress the diﬀerence between a sense of subjectivity (or of ownership) through which an individual
has the subjective experience of thinking, perceiving or acting, on the one hand, and the sense of
agency (or of copyright) in which the subject feels that she is the author of her act or the thinker of
her thought.23 But the way the distinction is used (and implicitly restricted to humans) in the
debate presupposes that we already have identiﬁed the stable foundation on which a subject can
establish the sense of being the same self—a basis that is crucial, as we saw, not only for the
possibility of reidentiﬁcation, but also for the unity of a self at any given time.24
The concept of self-attribution is thus ambiguous, between a ‘‘human’’ self and a lower-level
‘‘motor control’’ self. It may refer, on the one hand, to the sense that an occurrent action or
thought is under ones control—a sense of agency that we share with other animals (primates,
mammals, birds and ﬁsh); or it may mean, on the other hand, that the agent reﬂects on her actions
as an expression of her long-term beliefs, and gets control on her motivations, in a more uniﬁed
and ‘‘interwoven’’ way.25 Several authors have analyzed this interwovenness as the recognition
that our occurrent thoughts are causally determined by our long-standing propositional states.26
But as we saw, this will not secure the unicity of the thinker. The thread of a self does not consist
in belief possession (subject to reduplication) but rather in self-aﬀection, that is in the capacity for
a single occurrent thought to deliberately transform not only other states, but also mental dis-
positions.
Given the ambiguity explained above, most authors are in fact dealing with a form of self that
has nothing to do with a reidentiﬁable self; they are interested in attributions of agency of the type
‘‘I willfully broke the vase’’ versus ‘‘I was pushed and broke the vase.’’ What our former con-
ceptual analysis suggests however is that the kind of control and monitoring involved in repre-
senting oneself as a stable entity, responsible for her deeds, and permanently engaged in corrective
metacognition, is located at a level distinct both from the control loops of unreﬂective action,
perception, and memory, and from the level of simulating and planning actions. There must exist
a third level of control, at which a subject is able to simulate and monitor not her elementary
perceptions and actions, not her plans, but the courses of revision needed for the viability of the
agent among other agents, in a context extended over time. The subject needs to form dynamic
models of her own mental dispositions, to keep track of her previous revisions and critically
examine how reaﬀerences match what was expected. This allows her to plan her life at a deeper
level than just the instrumental level engaged in ordinary agency. It also allows her to simulate
observed agents engaged in individual, competitive or cooperative tasks, with possibly conﬂicting
intentions or selﬁsh goals.23 One of the questions that we can clarify on the basis of the present approach, is how the possession of a self, joint
to the sense of being oneself, interacts with the sense of agency and with the sense of ownership. This is a complex
question that we explore elsewhere.
24 See Campbell (1999), Peacocke (1999), and Proust (2000b), for an elaboration of this point.
25 Campbell (1999, p. 621).
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Fig. 1. Control levels: A semi-hierarchy.
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through a ‘‘command and predict’’ cycle that is functionally associated with other levels of the
hierarchy. The term of a semi-hierarchy refers to the fact that the various control loops can work
in part independently: you can represent yourself doing something without actually doing it, and
you can also act without thinking about the way you do it, or whether your doing it conforms to
your long-term goals and values.27 Therefore a represented self may be a motivation for acting or
not in speciﬁc ways, but it can also be inactive, or perturbed, without altering ordinary perception
and action. Reciprocally, the kind of metacognition relevant for a self is not engaged in every
single ordinary action. There may be however speciﬁc changes at lower levels that should dras-
tically aﬀect self-recognition.
In a simpliﬁed view of the control functions engaged in an entity capable of metacognition,
three levels have to be distinguished (cf. Fig. 1). Level 1 controls and monitors sensory processing
as occurring in perception and in motor activity. Level 2 simulates and monitors agency: various
courses of action must be chosen at every single moment; progress towards distal goals has to be
monitored until completion. These kinds of operations presuppose some form of hierarchical
dependency between level 1 and level 2, although automatic attentional capture must be present to
interrupt level 2 control when needed. Level 3 simulates and monitors agentic capacities in the
light of long-term values and plans. Again, level 3 operation presupposes that level 2 operations
can be relied upon as instantiating level 3 control models.
Let us observe that, in such a control theory, representations of possible alternative models of a
dynamic evolution can be formed on the basis of endogenous as well as exogenous stimuli. What
Jeannerod calls ‘‘covert simulation’’ belongs to each control level insofar as each requires a feed
forward model of the developing situation. There are however various ways of covertly simulating
a process, according to whether it is a motor, decisional, or evaluative process. Simulation thus
has to be referred to a speciﬁc functional domain, according to whether an action is to be pre-
dicted in its motor (level 1), instrumental (level 2) or social/evaluative consequences (level 3).27 For example, if you plan to be a pilot, you need to bring yourself to act as a pilot, to perceive as a pilot, etc.
Reciprocally, you can realistically plan to become a pilot only if your eyesight is correct etc. The important point is that
you do not need to permanently represent yourself as ‘‘a pilot’’ to pilot.
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correct to claim that, in a schizophrenic patient, level 2 control is disturbed (agency control, in its
conscious monitoring dimension), whereas Level 1 control is untouched, the subject recognizes the
reaﬀerences in their subjective component, but without the sense of expecting them as a conse-
quence of her own willful agency. There is therefore a frontal clash between level 1 intuitions of
mineness and level 2 intuitions of unwillingness. Level 3 is called upon to provide a dynamic
model of the case. Conﬂict is solved at level 3 in a more or less automatic way: the feeling of being
compelled to act provides subjective reaﬀerences for the immediately higher level of control; the
subject senses her own self being dissolving, parasited. On the reciprocal cases in which a patient
attributes to herself control of others actions (at level 2), her self is felt as ampliﬁed and extended
to other agents (at level 3). In both cases, deluded patients experience an alteration in the self-
other division—either because the self includes other beings (sensed as now being under potential
self control), or because the self has become part of other beings, or agents (sensed as taking
control of agency). These two forms of self-alteration are generally coexisting with a preserved
sense of individual history and memory, as can be predicted in the present hypothesis.5. Conclusion
The philosophical problem of personal identity consists in oﬀering a way of deﬁning a self that
allows understanding how an individual can be—and represent herself as—the same self although
her mental and bodily dispositions vary considerably, as well as the environment in which she is
leading her life. We suggested that this property of ‘‘ipseity’’ (a form of identity compatible with
change over time in certain properties) could only be captured in a memory process specializing in
dynamic belief/desire and value revision. This capacity belongs to metacognition. Our goal here
was ﬁrst to show on a conceptual basis how self-aﬀection constitutes the only way of constituting
a self, and of reidentifying oneself in the strong reﬂexive sense required. We further sketched how
this conceptual structure is realized in a semi-hierarchical control system; its control and moni-
toring dimensions account for the normative and descriptive components in self-representation.
Finally, we brieﬂy indicated how this account allows clarifying the discussion of schizophrenic
symptoms relating to self.References
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